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‘I have recognised through my travels that those with views quite 
contrary to ours are not on that account barbarians or savages, but 
that many of them make use of reason as much or more than we do. I 
thought, too, how the same man, with the same mind, if brought up 
from infancy among the French or Germans, develops otherwise than 
he would if he had always lived among the Chinese or cannibals and 
how, even in our fashions or dress, the very thing that pleased us ten 
years ago, and will perhaps please us again ten years hence, now 
strikes us as extravagant and ridiculous. Thus it is custom and 
example that persuade us, rather than any certain knowledge’ 
(Descartes, 1994, p119). 
 
‘Spatial cognition is a fundamental design requirement for every 
mobile species with a fixed territory or home base. And there is little 
doubt that it plays a central role in human thinking and reasoning. 
Indeed, the evidence for that centrality is all around us, in our 
language where spatial metaphors are used for many other domains, 
in the obvious cognitive utility of diagrams and tables, and in the 
special role of place in memory. The idea that space is a fundamental 
intuition built into our nature goes back at least to Kant, and the idea 
that our apperception of space is governed by cognitive universals 
informs much cognitive science. 
But in some ways human spatial cognition is puzzling. First, it is 
unspectacular – we are not as a species, compared to bees or pigeons, 
bats or whales, particularly good at finding our way around. Second, 
human spatial cognition is obviously variable – hunters, sailors and 
taxi-drivers are in a different league from the ordinary city dweller. 
This suggest that many aspects of effective spatial thinking depend 
on cultural factors, which in turn suggests limits to cognitive 
universals in this area (Levinson and Wilkins, 2006, p1).  
 
 
‘our flesh is earth and fire our desires, and the fire burns through the 
flesh, the water washes it all away. And what is left is air. And air 
rises towards heaven’ … ‘this old stuff - it produces the right words. 
You just say what the old people would have said, and something is 
explained. Somehow it’s easier to hear’ (Ryman, 2004, p29, p366). 
 
‘We shall have to make a beginning from our written characters, for 
we suppose these to be our earliest form of picture, and even their 
present form has not entirely lost the pictorial quality’ (Chiang Yee, 
1960, p16). 
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Introduction 
 
In this paper, I want to make an argument about the changing nature of 
space, place, and location, initially using Peter Sloterdijk’s philosophical 
history of surrounding as a foil before subsequently turning to an 
alternative source of inspiration, namely classical Chinese civilization. 
Thus, I will argue with Sloterdijk that as surrounds are ‘explicitated’1 in 
new ways so the questions that can be asked of space vary and against 
Sloterdijk in that turning to other civilizations suggests that surrounds 
may be explicitated in ways that he seems unwilling to countenance, and 
that when such a move is taken the questions that can be asked of space 
change in corresponding – and perhaps more interesting - ways.  
What I want to do is to conjure up a world in which new logographic 
languages are coming into being, based on a suite of technical, symbolic 
and psychic changes. These languages describe and therefore do space 
and time differently by producing multiple means of writing/situating 
events. It will be my contention that these languages are producing new 
forms of sensing the world which are being gradually inscribed on to our 
neural pathways. Logographic languages have been a staple of human 
experience but their importance has often been overlooked, not least 
because, in the West at least2, writing practice has taken on a particular 
form which presupposes a very limited set of sign carriers (such as the 
book) and assumes that these forms of writing practice occupy an 
evolutionary pinnacle according to which ‘true writing is alphabetic 
writing’ (Mignolo, 2003, p77)3. The result is that pictographic writing 
systems have been allowed limited purchase or simply dismissed as so 
limited in their range and usage that they are not even worthy of the 
description of ‘writing’ because they move beyond the graphical 
recording of language to take in other aspects of the world (Boone and 
Mignolo, 1994). 
To work my logographic thesis through, I will call on two main sources 
which in turn form the two main parts of the paper. One is the work of 
Peter Sloterdijk. I will use Sloterdijk’s philosophy of space/spatial 
                                                 
1 Though this neologism has been described as clumsy by some, I think it better reflects Sloterdijk’s 
intent which is to describe a process of rendering things public. Indeed, Sloterdijk (2007) uses it. 
2 Such languages still exist in degraded form in the West, of course. Think of the pictographic language 
of traffic signs, for example, or standard map symbols, or various kinds of diagrammatic convention. 
And this is before we get to all manner of specialist notations, from musical notations, through 
choreographic symbols, to various kinds of formulae, to modern genetic codings, all of them based on 
spatial relationships in some measure (Boone and Mignolo, 1994). Yet outside this formal realm, we 
now live in a blizzard of semi-formed hieroglyphs, bearing down on us from screens with messages we 
can only partly read. 
3 This is not to argue that alphabetic writing does not have its own complexities: it clearly does (See 
Ogborn, 2007). 
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philosophy as a foil: as a brilliant means of detecting what is at stake and 
as a flawed attempt at diagnosis. One of Sloterdijk’s inspirations has been 
Eastern philosophy, an inspiration which he has shared with philosophers 
as different as Leibniz, Hegel and Schopenhauer4, and which forms a 
bridge to the next major part of the paper, an interlude based on the 
principle that ‘the thought of the other remains inaccessible unless one is 
willing to rework one’s own’ (Jullien, 2007, p9). In the penultimate part 
of the paper, I then move to the example of Chinese classical thought to 
show, through actual examples, how logographic languages function and 
are able to produce very different kinds of world. In making this move, I 
want to understand the current shaping of the world in a rather different 
way from Sloterdijk. There is a brief conclusion. 
But to start out on this journey, I want to begin by calling on a source 
which illustrates what is at stake: the work of Humphry Repton, the 
leading English landscape gardener of the Regency period, who took over 
that mantle from his mentor, Lancelot ‘Capability’ Brown. Repton was 
the founder of what might be called the picturesque style. But he was 
more than that. As Daniels (1999) shows, Repton was a not just a shaper 
of site5, though he was certainly that. Rather, he can be seen as one of the 
inventors of a knowledge of disposition which we are only just beginning 
to realise makes more sense of the senses we have. That knowledge was 
able to integrate broad lines and detail in order to produce 
aesthetic/affective effects which were more than their parts. Though other 
disciplines could lay claim to prominence in this knowledge of 
disposition – architecture, theatre studies and dance, site-specific and 
installation art and land art amongst them – I want to argue that landscape 
gardening carries more weight in that it is concerned with sites that are 
consciously meant to shift and change and this evolutionary aspect of 
‘garden time’ (Sallis, 2006) will turn out to be crucial to my argument. 
Equally, only a few landscape gardens contain truly iconographic 
programmes and ‘even those are frequently meant to be evocative or 
polysemic rather than programmatic’ (Elkins, 2008, p70) Their effects are 
ambiguous and largely semiconscious, based on a different kind of grip 
which oft times resists the illusion of an observing subject:’ the object 
isn’t bound by our attention: it binds us’ (Elkins, 2008, p69). To put it 
another way: ‘If I step into a bath I am going to warm up: and perhaps 
gardens have that kind of control over our responses. On the other hand, 
it might be better to say that the reverie of gardens is only an inducement 
                                                 
4 Some have even claimed a relationship between Eastern philosophy and Heidegger, especially the 
later Heidegger. As we shall see, May (1989) argues that Heidegger borrowed some of the ideas for his 
philosophy directly from German translations of Chinese Daoist and Zen Buddhist classics. 
5 Though we call the result landscape, I want to avoid that term where I can. It comes with too much 
freight. 
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to a kind of thought that is often dormant in our professional prose’ 
(Elkins, 2008, p71). In order to ply his trade of unlocking potentiality, 
Repton invented several picturing practices to help him to design sites, 
sell his ideas for the sites to clients, and generally unleash a spidery 
quality of ‘thereness’. There were the famous Red Books in which he set 
out before and after vistas (Rogger, 2007). There were site visits. And 
there was a proto-language of the picturesque – we might call it a set of 
logographics – including ‘abrupt rocks’, water in rapid motion’ and 
‘steepness of ground’ - all devoted to making the site more interesting by 
creating chained links of spatial propositions which were outside the full 
awareness of the spectator. This new science of dynamic site, of spatial 
association and mingling, of pictures of (e)motion, of qualculated reverie, 
had little in the way of canonical conceptual foundations, in the manner 
of painting or sculpture or architecture6, but that has not prevented it, 
since Repton’s time, from becoming a large and thriving industry, using 
standard forms of logographics and computer design to ply its trade. 
Courses abound. Specialist products multiply. Enthusiasm for the charms 
of landscape gardens and gardens generally often seems to be unbounded. 
But the same core principle applies as in Repton’s time: the production of 
sites through a logographic language7 which is composed of fundamental 
visual units (graphemes) which represent a word or a morpheme (a 
meaningful unit of language), and stands in contrast to phonograms, 
which represent phonemes (speech sounds) or combinations of 
phonemes. Logograms are composed of visual elements arranged in a 
variety of ways, instead of using the segmental phoneme principle of 
construction that is used in alphabetic languages. The fundamental point 
is that logographic languages make it possible to write space as a flow of 
life in ways which phonemic languages find difficult to express because 
they do not cleave to the principle of representing normal spoken words 
but instead develop notations which can take in other registers, and 
especially (but not only) those that arise from the human ability to ‘grasp 
certain relationships visually at a glance but not to describe them with 
words with anything like equal precision’ (Drake, 1986, p136). 
I want to argue that the experience/knowledge of site is the sixth sense, if 
you like, an insight that is there in the work of Heidegger and other 
phenomenologists but that is too often overrun by a desire for authenticity 
which is poisonous to understanding. Given that writers of a 
phenomenological bent took much of their impetus from a sense of site I 
                                                 
6 So that a philosophy of gardening sounds faintly ridiculous - which is not to say that it has not been 
tried (see Cooper, 2006). 
7 Sometimes known as "ideograms" or "hieroglyphics", which can also be called "hieroglyphs". Strictly 
speaking, however, ideograms represent ideas directly rather than words and morphemes, and no 
logogrammatical systems are, in fact, truly ideographic. 
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think it can be argued that they often used the wrong – phonographic - 
tools to engage with and describe what they were trying to get at8. For 
example, there is the case of Heidegger’s beloved hut at Todtnauberg 
(Sharr, 2006), as well as his other home bases at Freiburg and Meßkirch. 
It is clear that Heidegger was trying to describe the efficacy of sites like 
these in both general and specific terms9 but very often the closest he is 
able to get to the sudden affective grip of a site is through the medium of 
poetry and he often bemoans the failures of given modes of thought, 
language and symbolization to capture the interest and promise of site 
(Clark, 2007).  
 
I also want to argue that something has changed about site and how it is 
constructed. As Stiegler (2007) has pointed out, the environment is 
becoming what Simondon called an associated milieu, or a techno-
geographical milieu. That is the world is full of machines that can convert 
the environment into a technical function and back again, over and over 
again. The question becomes ‘the participation of human geography in 
the process of associated technical milieux’ (Stiegler, 2007, p335), arising 
out of a combination of symbolic evolution, technical evolution, and 
psychic evolution. It is these three inter-related evolutions and how they 
permit new forms of knowledge of disposition to exist which allow 
experience to be recalibrated that I want to explore in this paper, but 
through the lens of another culture. The first evolution is in the nature of 
signs. Contemporary environments are crowded with signs, all 
clamouring for our attention. The issue therefore becomes how to 
produce signs that will grab that attention, usually briefly and nearly 
always semiconsciously, as affective torsions, through the design of 
environments that are themselves designed to function as signs. Signs are 
no longer written down and along but written in and through as recurrent 
chants or refrains10. They become landscapes in their own right (Ingold, 
2007). The second evolution is in the nature of technical engines. By dint 
of developments in information technology, these are gradually becoming 
pervasive, spreading into and enlivening every nook and cranny of life 
with information about information which itself becomes an active 
player. The third evolution is in the nature of the psyche. This is no 
longer modelled on the individual psyche but on mimetic waves of 
sentiment which are able to move more and more rapidly through 
populations because of the previous developments I have outlined (Thrift, 
2007). Association becomes more and more like the British weather, 
                                                 
8 There have been attempts by some authors to produce a pictographic language which can describe 
site, most notably Hägerstrand’s time-geography. 
9 One might even argue that he invents new cardinals in order to aid his cause (see Malpas, 2008). 
10 The reference to Deleuze’s work on the refrain is clear here, but I would want to historicize it. 
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changeable and open to all kinds of influence, a round of moods coded by 
the commodified genres of public intimacy that have sprouted since the 
eighteenth century and have now become general (Thrift, 2008c, Berlant, 
2008, Roach, 2007).  
 
The net result of these three evolutions is, as I have argued at length 
elsewhere, (see Thrift, 2008a, b, c, d) the rise of an art of writing 
suggestible environments, environments which are able to catch and 
amplify mood in the manner of gardens, allowing us to bathe in an 
affective ether of signs and thus produce an intensified everyday. The 
kinds of knowledge of heating up and cooling down affect generated by 
this ‘authentic capitalism’ (Gilmore and Pine, 2007, Thrift, 2005, 2008) 
depend upon making environments sufficiently explicit that they are able 
to produce reasonably predictable affective awakenings and immediacies 
which feel real - or real enough, anyway. Logographic notations are 
clearly a key part of the production of new norms of picturing practice 
(Clunas, 1997) since they produce different apprehensions of space which 
are able to fit more easily into the emplacement of each affective ‘now’; 
understanding, as Weber (2008, p175) puts it, following Benjamin, that 
this is space as both room or container and the stage for a play where 
something comes to pass, a ‘passage-way, perhaps, but one that is not 
going anywhere’. 
 
But to be able to have and deal in such an art of the continuous means 
making space explicit in new ways and that, in turn, suggests turning to 
the work of the author who has done most of late to consider the 
acceleration of ‘explicitation’ of these atmospheres, namely Peter 
Sloterdijk. 
 
Sloterdijk and Sphären 
 
I want to begin this paper by briefly examining the work of Peter 
Sloterdijk on the history of surrounding or sheltering11. I want to argue 
that, in many ways, Sloterdijk is a prescient thinker in that in his 
emphasis on inserting space into philosophy – hardly as rare a move as he 
                                                 
11 In this paper, I am also implicitly making an argument that what we regard as social research is 
changing its form. Though I am sure that social science feels secure - at the peak of its powers in some 
respects - I think that there is every reason to think that it will fall on hard times, as its functions are 
taken up by other actors. These actors include not just the legions of knowing capitalism (Burrows and 
Savage, 2007) but also philosophers who, through the sheer range of what they do, seem to displace the 
social scientist’s role. I will want to suggest that work like Sloterdijk’s is symptomatic of that crisis and 
shows that social science must change if it is not to become simply a set of footnotes to the world. 
Equally, however, it seems necessary to me that social and cultural theory must change too. It cannot 
stay outside the fold of the norms of evidence that it implicitly appeals to. 
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makes out, but still rare enough - he poses a series of questions and 
answers that too many have disavowed or reduced to insignificance. Most 
particularly, he is willing to make way for an intellectual history which is 
not just a history of ideas but lets the forces of practice surge on to the 
stage as actors who are suddenly given voices and called into 
representation. In other words, he provides a history of different modes of 
subsistence, forms of ‘ontological strangeness’ (Rodowick, 2007) which 
concentrate on what it is to reproduce the world as a matter of 
‘explicitation’. Phenomenology becomes a moving anthropotechnic 
process of becoming rather than an intensified form of observation of 
what is there, a phenomenology in which consequences are more 
important than foundations. It follows that such a phenomenology is open 
to historical and geographical inquiry, able to be stratified by time and 
space. In contradistinction to much social science which has too often 
been obsessed by epistemology in the mistaken belief that this is what 
distinguishes scientific from non-scientific practices12, his work is not. 
His emphasis has been and is consistently ontological. Then he is willing 
to countenance all manner of actors, up to and including ‘nature-actors’ 
like oil (Sloterdijk, 2007): ‘being-with’ is not just restricted to human 
beings. In other words, like Latour, Sloterdijk wants to populate the world 
with a much greater range of actors than is normally declared fit and 
proper in order to be able to identify the potentiality of new forms of life 
(Michaud, 2002). Then, he understands the fact that the world is made up 
of dark matter, all the unknown (that is unformatted and therefore 
supposedly inactive) entities that bind what is present but which we 
cannot detect13. Thus an impoverished view of the world can be a ground 
only because it is fed by all kinds of forces that announce their presence 
indirectly because they have never been made explicit. Finally, and most 
importantly, Sloterdijk works in many media. He is not just a 
philosopher. He is also a novelist, a writer of tour guides, even the host of 
a television programme. No surprise, then, that he tries to write in a way 
which escapes the grim piety and oracular heaviness of so much 
philosophy. In its fictive character, his work strives to be more than 
words, even as words are his main tool. And he is willing to use more 
than words. Take his most famous work, Sphären (Sloterdijk, 1998, 1999, 
2004), a philosophical history of the spaces of space. Its three volumes 
are scattered with all manner of illustrations in a very un-philosophy-like 
manner. It always feels to me as though Sloterdijk, just like Heidegger, is 
striving to articulate a world in which site counts but he is willing to use a 
much greater range of means to achieve this goal than most philosophers. 
                                                 
12 Whereas after several decades of work on the social studies of science, we can now be clear that 
what distinguishes science is the intermediaries that its agents are able to bring to bear. 
13 Here Sloterdijk comes close to the Latourian reading of plasma (Latour, 2005). 
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As a result, he strays into all kinds of territories usually touched on only 
lightly by philosophers, including that domain known as social science. 
 
In effect, Sloterdijk provides a history of thinking space that works out 
from the earliest times to the present. Space is understood 
‘gynaecologically’ as a set of envelopes or surrounds or shelters, self-
animated spaces that give their inhabitants the resources to produce 
worlds. His account of the explicitation of these atmo-spheres is 
relatively well-known and I will only give the barest of details of this 
phenomenology, therefore. For Sloterdijk all being is being-with; there 
can be no I without us to put it in a non-Heideggerian way. This 
extension of Heidegger which, incidentally, is common wisdom in much 
of modern psychology and neuroscience14, is made strange because 
Sloterdijk adds in a spatial dimension of being-with-in-a-world that is a 
sphere  (whether the sphere is a womb, a home, a polis, a nation, an 
empire, or some other sheltering envelope), a move which allows him to 
picture pictures of what life might be when generated from within 
existence: ‘Human beings are at bottom and exclusively creatures of their 
interiors and the results of their work on the form of immanence that is 
inseparable from them. They thrive only in the hothouse of their 
autogenic atmosphere’ (Sloterdijk, 1998, p46). Without our worlds, in 
other words, we are nothing. 
 
Moving out from this root account of environments as ‘climatizations’ 
formatted by their inhabitants, Sloterdijk offers a philosophical history of 
these hothouses, different forms of being there which exist because 
human beings ‘have given them form, content, extension and relative 
duration when they inhabit them’ (Sloterdijk, 1998, p47). He argues that 
Western history has taken place as three roundelays: a Greek-inspired 
notion of an ordered cosmic sphere that encompasses all of human 
experience, a period of globalization in which the earth becomes an 
object of active survey, open to travel and exploration in a ‘free outside’ 
which itself becomes an interior, and a ‘post-historical’ period of 
bubbling foam in which there is no unknown outside which produces a 
multiplicity of lifeworlds produce all manner of microclimates which 
communicate frantically - but in autistic ways.  
 
But is this account right? I think there are three main problems. First, 
there is the problem of detail. Sloterdijk is writing philosophical history 
and commentary but with unusually high levels of detail, a strategy which 
produces inevitable tensions. Through the very range of evidence he 
                                                 
14 See, for example, the work of John Shotter or that strand of work inspired by the discovery of mirror 
neurons. 
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draws on, Sloterdijk can be seen as providing a bridge between 
philosophy and social science, but it is a problematic bridge15. Whereas 
in philosophy detail tends to work as an illustration of an idea, as a 
rhetorical device, or as an edifying moment, in social science detail can 
never be extraneous. Detail counts. It really counts. And Sloterdijk knows 
this perfectly well. Indeed, unusually for works of philosophy, the three 
volumes of Sphären, for example, are chockfull of dense and learned 
empirical detail drawn from a wide variety of sources – from literature, 
from history, from psychology, from anthropology, from the history of art 
and science, and so on – which is clearly there as something more than 
anecdote or illustration. One might unfairly parody Sloterdijk’s work as 
Nietzsche plus Heidegger plus evidence carefully marshalled to show that 
‘images can make history’ (Sloterdijk, 2008, p48). But how one interprets 
this evidence, partly because of its sheer range and partly because of a 
fictive style drawing on a variety of different sources of inspiration16, is 
something worth considering once it is deployed as something more than 
an ornament or example, as it undoubtedly is. This is not a trivial issue, 
given that Sloterdijk is trying to debunk what he considers fantasies and 
illusions which can have dire consequences because they are taken so 
seriously and he is clearly marshalling what he considers telling evidence 
that is meant, in some sense, to counter these fantasies and illusions17.  
 
But this is where it is easy to get into hot water. With obvious exceptions 
like Walter Benjamin, the general problem for continental philosophy has 
been that too often it has equated the empirical with ultimately disposable 
details in a way that is ultimately very far from social science18. 
Sloterdijk occupies an uncomfortable mid-ground insofar as he provides 
an oscillating position between the hyperbolic claim and the revealing 
detail which is never really resolved (as one might argue was the case in 
Benjamin’s work). That is both an undoubted attraction of his work in 
                                                 
15 As a corollary, philosophy should not be used as a set of empirical facts that can be harvested by 
social scientists or as an unproblematic arbiter of their woes.  
 
16 Including the ‘philosophical science fiction’ of Flusser. 
17 It could, of course, be argued that the conundrum posed by Sloterdijk’s work is an extreme example 
of a more general condition. Continental philosophy often consists of stories which are implicitly 
claimed to be diagnostic accounts of the world with some claims to veracity. But when their status as 
an account is challenged, too often the critic is accused of either a Gradgrind or even a Bartleby 
moment.  
18 But this detail is at the heart of social science in the guise of the case. As Berlant (2007) makes clear 
what constitutes the case is a moveable feast but that does not mean that it is just anything to hand. 
Empiricism means that occasions are the theoretically important object we want to detect and 
metaphysical questioning arises from following the occasion, rather than vice versa. Empirical facts 
provide inspiration. But philosophy too often tends to homogenise as it searches for grand themes and 
syntheses. It tends to look for the big or it wants to dig down in order to hit the bedrock of an 
explanation that can take the world in (even as, in Sloterdijk’s case, the opposite is often claimed 
through a general critique of totalizing views). 
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that it sets up all kinds of interesting tensions, unsuspected associations 
and revealing discrepancies, so generating all kinds of new byways for 
thought. But it is also a considerable challenge. 
 
Then, there is another allied problem. The pronouncements become 
increasingly suspect as we reach the present day. In particular, 
Sloterdijk’s depiction of a world of bubbling foam is not, I think, either 
original or able to provide much in the way of insight. It simply 
reproduces the same kinds of jeremiads as writers as diverse as Zizek and 
Bauman in arguing that what we now face is a public form of privacy 
which will drag us down into mediocrity, able to choose our obsessions 
but not much else. ‘The statement that each man is an island has more or 
less come true for the majority of the populations of modern big cities …’ 
(Sloterdijk, 2008, p47). Co-isolated, it is true, but still isolated: 
‘multiplicities of loosely adjacent lifeworld cells’ (Sloterdijk, 2008, p48) 
that declaim a state of ‘egalitarian total inclusion’ (Sloterdijk, 2008, p57). 
Based on a particular appropriation of aesthetics, these kinds of accounts 
of the horrors of public intimacy and empty choice often run 
uncomfortably close to the denigrations of mass culture by both left and 
right which were so prominent in the 1960s but which have now been 
comprehensively displaced by less passive and more nuanced accounts 
(c.f. Carroll, 1998, Berlant, 2008). There are three inter-related problems 
to cope with. First, such accounts work with a degraded notion of 
aesthetics which lacks any notion of the kinds of everyday aesthetics 
which structure so much of being, seemingly innocuous objects and 
environments which are the main part of a culture’s calling (Saito, 2007). 
Not the least part of our dealings with everyday things is space, 
specifically how it is arranged and disposed. Such spatial sensibilities are 
key to how we go on and they are much more various and variegated than 
Sloterdijk allows19. Second, they are empirically unreliable. Most 
ethnographic accounts of consumption are simply at variance with these 
accounts. Sloterdijk’s account is a set of stock conclusions, taken off the 
shelf of standard laments about the modern world. But there is no 
evidence from what is now a shoal of studies of consumers and 
consumption that the world is like this. These studies describe a world 
that is very different. Full of the alienation produced by commodity 
production but equally possessed by care, even love, expressed by and 
through these very same commodities. Things provide comfort and 
consolation, even balance, as well as the cold (Miller, 2008). Equally, the 
commodified institutions of public intimacy through which things are 
                                                 
19 Which is not to say that Sloterdijk is unaware of cultural differences in the qualities of space and 
spatiality. In particular, and particularly relevant to this paper, see the discussion of Chinese space in 
the second volume of Sphären, Oddly, he makes little of such differences. 
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now so often linked with human life have a long and subtle history which 
does not permit of gross generalisation and which leaves room for all 
kinds of forms of warmth and intelligence (Roach, 2007, Thrift, 2008c). 
In turn, the surrounds of surrounding are porous and fleeting, not so much 
like apartments and stadiums full of densely if differentially packed 
consumers, as new kinds of community with multiple allegiances which 
are communicating on a level which is both aesthetic and moral20 Third, 
they also induce a quite unnecessary political quietism by producing an 
account of the world that does nothing so much as an echo of some of the 
new and pervasive forms of regulation that are now coming into 
existence. Miller and Rose (2008, p25) describe a new form of rule which 
has come into being over the last decades based upon the proliferation of 
little regulatory instances across a territory and their multiplication, at a 
‘molecular’ level, through the interstices of our present experience. But 
they are describing a governmental project, not an accomplished fact. It 
might be more accurate to describe the new world we now face in this 
way - as contested terrain - rather than as the advent of a blockbuster 
‘post-history’. 
 
But there is one more problem upon which I want to concentrate in this 
paper. That is an unwitting but potent Eurocentrism. It may be that the 
ancient Greeks set up a particular spherical world of the cosmos which 
became general in the West21. It may be that the second outward-looking 
phase of globalization can stand as a metaphor for all imperial and/or 
mercantilist adventures. It may be that the latest phase of globalization is 
producing, on the back of information technology and manic levels of 
travel, something like foam in some parts of the world. But other 
accounts are equally plausible, at least if take note of other parts of the 
world and their apprehensions of space. 
 
Let us start with one of Sloterdijk’s key philosophical patrons, Martin 
Heidegger. Both in concert with Heidegger’s thought, and taking his 
thinking on as an ‘ontotopology’ of being and space, Sloterdijk argues 
that being in the world is always ‘being-with’ (the co-ordinate constituent 
of mitsein) but set within shared interiors which themselves constitute 
what that ‘with’ can consist of (Fuss, 2004). But what if the 
phenomenology of prepositions like ‘with’ and ‘in’ could be shown to be 
different in different parts of the world? What if different worlds could be 
shown to exist in which even these most basic of cardinals could be 
shown to vary? 
 
                                                 
20 Thus referring back to the original meaning of aesthetics. 
21 Although, as Lloyd (2007) points out, there was never just one ancient Greek worldview. 
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This is, of course, precisely what disciplines like anthropology, 
archaeology, ethology and psychology have been systematically showing 
over the last few decades22. In particular, they have overturned many 
commonly held views about space. To take but one example, the original 
and highly influential depiction of Hopi space produced by Whorf has 
been overturned by Malotki and others. More specifically, Levinson 
(2003, p20, p324) has shown that in most cases that ‘people who speak a 
language that favours one specific frame of reference will tend to think in 
similar terms, that is they use a co-ordinate system of the same 
underlying type in language and non-verbal cognition’. In other words, 
they use different cognitive styles which depend on ‘constructing 
culturally specific geometric analyses of objects in the intrinsic frame, 
culturally specific transformations of axes in the relative frame, or 
culturally specific fixed bearings in the absolute frame’. When language 
is written down, moving from the domains of mouth and ears to hands 
and eyes, it can undergo further differential development as new modes 
of learnability are introduced. Many decades ago now, Derrida 
(1967/1998) understood that alphabetic systems of written language were 
but one route that might be taken in representing the wor(l)d but he did 
not take his insight far enough in that he did not entirely escape an 
evolutionary model of writing which places alphabetic writing at a 
putative peak of development23, not least because of his concentration on 
the critique of Western writing systems from within (Mignolo, 2003).  
 
To summarize my argument so far, I have argued that Sloterdijk’s 
account of the modern world is hemmed in by propositions about the 
nature of evidence and cultural preconceptions about space24 and to 
illustrate this contention I want provide another account of the current 
state of the world and how we might evidence it.  In forging this account, 
I will stray into zones that are often kept apart - like theory, methodology, 
and history - in order to give another rendition of the current round of 
explication/explicitation and of the work of serial redescription that it 
entails and how this account can produce an alternative history of spatial 
practices from Sloterdijk’s, one that I will argue has at least as much 
credibility.  
 
                                                 
22 Famously, for example, they have debated whether certain tribes really do understand the 
mechanisms of procreation or other biological functions. 
23 More specifically, Derrida was concerned with the emergent idea of the sign divided into signifier 
and signified. 
24 Understanding culture as a habitus, a sophisticated system of dispositions, but only in the original 
more expansive sense found in Aquinas (see Davies, 2002) in which, rather than in the cut-down form 
that Bourdieu has made popular, habitus can make us able to achieve unforeseeable actions. 
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Interlude 
 
So what if we start from different premises about space? Throughout the 
history of Western philosophy, philosophers have turned to other thought 
systems for relief. The turn to these systems of thought has often been in 
conflict with the idea of a universal, common human nature but has been 
no less sincere for that25. Take but three examples of this interchange. 
Thus, to begin with, there is the case of John Locke. Famously, Locke 
had an interest in the thought systems of peoples of other countries, most 
notably the Americas and India, as well as China26. Then there is the case 
of Martin Heidegger who acknowledged the closeness of his thought to 
the Daoist tradition and to Zen Buddhism; ‘perhaps there lies concealed 
in the word ‘Way’, tao, the mystery of all mysteries of thoughtful saying, 
as long as we let this name return to an unspokenness and are able to 
accomplish this letting … All is Way’ (Heidegger, 2003, p). He even 
collaborated with a Chinese scholar on a translation into German of the 
Lao-tzu, though they only completed eight of the eighty one chapters27. 
Indeed, May (1996) has even argued that early on, as well as later in his 
career, Heidegger borrowed some of the major ideas of his philosophy 
from German translations of Chinese Daoist and Zen Buddhist classics, 
sometimes word for word28. Finally, there is the case of Peter Sloterdijk 
himself. Sloterdijk visited Bhagwan Shree Rajnash in Pune in 1980 and is 
known for his references to Buddhism and Daoism (Sloterdijk, 1989). 
 
But, for reasons that I hope will become obvious, I want to concentrate on 
Leibniz’s later work on China. Though he never visited China, Leibniz 
was a prolific correspondent and a number of his correspondents were 
missionaries with direct knowledge of China (Spence, 1978). His thought 
                                                 
25 But tolerance should not be misinterpreted as anything other than that. For example, Spinoza was 
certainly tolerant to other thought systems but, at least in part, because he did not consider that they 
mattered. Consider this exchange between Burgh and Spinoza. 
‘You assume that you have at length discovered the true philosophy. How do you know that your 
philosophy is the best out of all those that have ever been taught in this world, are at present being 
taught, or will ever be taught in the future? To say nothing of possible future philosophies, have you 
examined all those philosophies, both ancient and modern, which are taught here, and in India, and 
everywhere through the whole world’. 
‘[Your question], I might with greater right ask you; for I do not presume to have found the best 
philosophy, but I know I understand the true philosophy. If you ask me how I know this, I reply that I 
know it in the same way that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles … For truth is 
an index of itself and the false’ (cited in Perkins, 2004, p37). 
 
26 Though no one would say that this interest was disinterested, given Locke’s expansionist aim of 
extending civil order so as to guarantee the preservation of the law of nature (Mignolo, 2003). 
27 The traffic was not all one way. Famously, Japanese philosophy was influenced by Heidegger’s 
thought, most especially the so-called Kyoto School of philosophy (Parkes, 1987). 
28 Which conjures up the delicious thought that Heidegger’s thought is based on East Asian notions of 
time, space and being. 
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bears a close resemblance to early Chinese metaphysical views of the 
world and, though his writings on China were chiefly concerned with 
rebutting anti-accommodationists who argued that the Chinese were truly 
heathen29, still the echoes are sometimes uncanny, down to the 
identification of the supposed isomorphism of the I Ching and Leibniz’s 
system of binary arithmetical notation30. Though it would be stretching 
things to say that Leibniz’s philosophy was deeply indebted to Chinese 
thought, he certainly found a companion, even a consolation, in the 
interpretations of this thought he was offered by his correspondents and 
his wider reading and not just a tolerance of diversity31.  
 
Most particularly, Leibniz, unlike, say, Spinoza, was willing to 
countenance not only that other peoples thought differently but that this 
thinking might make a difference. This is important when it comes to 
thinking about space. For what we now know is that different peoples can 
and do think differently about space and that this thinking effects what 
and how they do. But when I say thinking I am not meaning to imply a 
bodily and environmental infrastructure through which different kinds of 
thinking are able to flow free as water. No. What is happening is that 
body and environment are part of how this thinking happens, constantly 
interacting to enact a spatial representation which is part-learnt and part-
improvised. Human beings have a particular behavioural preference 
based on the place-based foraging strategies of the common ancestor of 
the hominidae which privileged foraging within a stable territory 
(Newcombe and Huttenlocher, 2000). Thus they use a spatial toolkit 
common to many animals that need to feed upon dispersed resources and 
therefore  need the wherewithal of an ‘intuitive physics’ (Eilan, 
McCarthy and Brewer, 1998) to remember locations and how to find 
them, including dead reckoning of various kinds, knowing when to start 
and stop, and using landmarks (Healy, 1998). But, over time, human 
beings have been able to evolve a richer locational armoury as a result of 
needing to forage in novel environments (Haun, Call, Janzen and 
Levinson, 2006): they have added prostheses such as objects of various 
kinds and, of course, they can deploy language which may have primarily 
                                                 
29 Equally, and relatedly, Leibniz had a heated exchange with Newton (through Newton’s protégé, 
Clark) on the essential nature of spatial concepts. Whereas Newton insisted that space was an abstract 
envelope, all the evidence suggests that Leibniz was right when he argued that space was relational, 
that is the location or motion of one thing is described by its relation to other things. 
 
30  For example, it has been argued that Leibniz took the use of Chinese binary notation, which he 
discovered through studying the I Ching and hexagrams and  converted it into a binary mathematics 
which is the foundation of the computer age (Bowker, 2008). 
 
31 Note the word interpretation; Leibniz misunderstood some elements of classical Chinese philosophy, 
either on his own account or because of the biases and mistakes of his correspondents. 
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evolved as a response to the rich texture of human social life but could 
then be turned to other means. 
 
The net result of this evolution is that human beings can produce a rich 
and diverse range of cognitive styles of practicing and thereby 
understanding space. This richness and diversity has probably increased 
(insofar as it is possible to measure these things) in that technical 
prostheses like film have provided a whole new overlay of ways of 
representing and experiencing space which have made it increasingly 
possible to think of oneself as ‘outside’, as one object amongst others 
inhabiting a map of some kind. Equally, it is probable that the sensory 
modalities by which we know and experience location have multiplied, 
both because they are better understood and more likely to be consciously 
worked on, and because of the sheer range of objects that are to hand. 
Finally, it is likely that, insofar as space and selfhood are connected32, 
more kinds of spatial subjectivity exist, in part because, to echo a 
classical Kantian theme, there are more ways of joining up experiences in 
such a way as to produce a particular spatial world and, thus, more ways 
of making sense of oneself (Bayart, 2007)33. 
 
To grasp the cultural richness of spatial cognition, I want to return to the 
disciplines of cognitive psychology and anthropology and especially to 
the work of Stephen Levinson (2003, Levinson and Wilkins, 2006). As I 
have pointed out, Levinson’s work shakes the idea of innate human 
cognition by showing how language and spatial cognition are tied 
together so as to produce widely varying practices of space and spatial 
thinking. Spatial representation is thus a fundamental aspect of the 
different cognitive styles – and biases - of cultures, an integral part of 
their demonstrative range. Languages distribute spatial information in 
different ways and there are very few hard and fast generalizations to be 
made but there is reason to believe that ‘there is a good case for 
supposing that language, and more broadly communication systems, are 
causal factors in inducing specific ways of thinking about space’ 
(Levinson and Wilkins, 2006, p2). 
 
That this is can be so is able to be demonstrated by studying Leibniz’s 
beloved China. There, the spatial demonstratives that the culture can 
access are very different from those found in the West (Yu, 2004). Bodily 
stances and gesture, cardinals, and sound ranges all differ significantly. 
This becomes even clearer if we add in writing – a system of 
                                                 
32 Which is, of course, a contested thesis. 
33 In each of these cases, of course, we may also have lost ways of being but I do not subscribe to the 
idea that we live now in a disenchanted and thereby impoverished world. 
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communication which occupies a position between a material prosthesis 
and language. Not only is the system of writing very different, not least in 
the time acquired to gain the necessary skills and the innately spatial 
character of its layout34 - a point to which I will return - but it also 
enshrines values that Western writing does not own to; for example 
calligraphy can be understood as an aspect of personality since the 
creation of written words is regarded as akin to a visual performance (Shi 
Bo, 2003, Lu Chi, 2000); ‘in the present-day style of writing, though the 
original image has in many cases been lost, there is still a vivid enough 
image to move the reader’s feeling and stir associations with other 
characters’ (Chiang Yee, 1973, p35). I want to claim that the way in 
which these characters not only use visual means to capture affect but 
themselves become affective ciphers can provides a means of inspiration 
in the investigation of the mood-catching environments which are 
becoming the stuff of everyday life. 
 
China Between Literal and Figurative  
 
I have argued elsewhere (Thrift, 2007, 2008, a, b, c, d) that a new kind of 
capitalism has gradually been gaining ground in the West, based in 
capturing semiconscious flows of affect, up to and including not only 
minor affects like envy but even grand affects like love. Part of the 
armoury of this capitalism has been the derivation of new kinds of writing 
based, at least in part, on the rediscovery of the kinds of nondiscursive 
culture that typified early modern England in which literacy was a 
comparatively rare commodity but the recognition of all manner of visual 
signs35 (including a scattering of words on walls and on everyday objects) 
was not; ‘the early modern period had a way of understanding the relation 
of writing to the mind, and to the world outside it, that was not that of 
representation or reference’ (Fleming, 2001, p164). In a culture which 
was alert ‘to the appearance of writing in non-alphabetic forms and to the 
oneiric resonance that accompanies even a book-bound, alphabetic script’ 
(Fleming, 2001, p153), there developed ‘a mode of knowledge that 
simultaneously thinks through matter and accords it a sensibility of its 
own’ (Fleming, 2001, p164). 
 
At this time in history, we might understand everyday culture as again 
becoming based on these premises, not least because the meaning 
systems founded in only partially systematised but still potent logographs 
found in the picturing practices of increasingly informationalised moving 
                                                 
34 Though whether certain qualities such as the incidence of left-handedness vary because of the nature 
of Chinese script, which is difficult to write with the left hand, is still a matter of contestation.  
35 As well as aural and tactile and olfactory signs. 
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images are proliferating36 – whether in the shape of various media frames 
and conventions, icons like brands or celebrities, or even new forms of 
surface - and these are becoming distributed through environments as 
refrains in ways which themselves depend upon logographic means of 
expression to produce guaranteed affective effects. In other words, just as 
non-discursive cultures like early modern England were able to form a 
powerful apprehension of space and its relationship to affect through both 
phonemic and logographic means, an apprehension that was never simply 
a transitional form, so something similar is happening again as new 
semiotic trails are laid down. But this hybrid power is not based in the 
same technologies of representation. Rather, out of an amalgam of new 
materials and scripts, the apprehension of space we are busily 
rediscovering is one which is suited to a time of the construction of 
continuously generated suggestible environments driven by the paradigm 
of seduction within which we now live (Klingmann, 2007), in that it 
furnishes us with the arts and the means we need to both construct and to 
appreciate consciously produced mood-catching environments.   
 
But in order to understand better this new world made up of scripts based 
on graphemes as well as phonemes which can be used to describe and 
produce suggestible sites on a continuous basis – scripts which we cannot 
always name but which are still creating tracks - I want to draw an 
analogy with another culture in another time, one that I will insist has 
much to teach us about where we are now heading. Taking my cue from 
the spirit of intercultural exchange promoted by Leibniz and other 
European thinkers as they struggled to find a place for different kinds of 
thought (Leibniz, 1994, Perkins, 2004), I will take as my leitmotif China, 
which was and is again becoming a key centre of the world (c.f. Brook, 
1998, Clunas, 1991, 1997, 2007), and more specifically a set of accounts 
of the aesthetic norms of Chinese classical culture based on the findings 
of contemporary scholarship which have been able to uncover a 
remarkable technical, symbolic and psychic history (e.g. Barrett, 2008), 
in order to provide the beginnings of a  description of how the world is 
currently being written anew by looking to a culture in which logographic 
apprehensions of space held sway. 
 
There is no exact homology, of course. It goes without saying that 
classical Chinese civilization was a very different culture from ours and 
care needs to be exercised. To take just one example, classical Chinese 
philosophical thinking was based on a particular notion of how the world 
was present. Thus, in contradistinction to Christian-influenced Western 
                                                 
36 ‘Pictures in motion write our modern history’ (Bruno, 2004, p24). 
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thinking, there was no notion of immortality and the distinction between 
philosophy and religion did not exist37. Rather, the aim was to live a good 
and fulfilling life by amplifying the ‘vital nourishment’ of the body. This 
was not an activity meant to produce progress toward something so much 
as it was an attempt to achieve continual renewal through various 
mechanisms of modification and incitement and thus produce incessant 
reconnection with life, rather than allowing it ‘to cling and adhere – to 
some investment, some representation or some affect, as caring about 
things inclines us to do – and subsequently to stagnate and wither’ 
(Jullien, 2007a, p27). It follows that such a viewpoint was not concerned 
with the activity of knowing as such ‘which is endless and thus 
hemorrhagic in terms of energy and vitality’ but rather with concentrating 
‘on man’s ability to use and preserve the vital potential vested in him’ 
(Jullien, 2007a, p15). Thus to study life meant not ‘to study what life is 
(as it would be if defined from the point of view of knowledge) or how to 
live (as it would be if defined from the point of view of morality) but to 
learn to deploy, preserve, and develop the capacity for life with which we 
are all endowed’ (Jullien, 2007a, p14). It is likely that this produced an 
unusual sensitivity to perception of the environment, albeit sensitivity of 
a particular kind. Equally, care needs to be exercised in taking classical 
Chinese culture on its own terms. So far as picturing practice is 
concerned, it is clear that the very definite aesthetic hierarchies which 
circulated amongst the elite were not necessarily owned by every citizen - 
the issue of reception remains largely unresolved. Whether we look to the 
emphasis on deixis, so much at odds with the Western tradition until 
recently, or the apparent emphasis on moving beyond representation, 
discarding any attachment to mimesis, again only recently taken up in the 
Western tradition, such aesthetic values were not necessarily taken for 
granted or uncontested but, that aid, such differences do provide useful 
and revealing signposts insofar as they provide models for what is now 
happening to space in the West, a means, to echo Jullien’s comment at 
the beginning of the paper, of beginning to rework our thought so that it 
can explain current conditions. 
 
In particular, I will want to take four successive takes on classical 
Chinese culture in order to analogically illustrate what may be happening 
to space in the present. My intention is to use that Chinese experience – 
based in different means of scripting the world - to throw light on current 
tendencies, to teach us new ways in which we might see what is 
happening. 
 
                                                 
37 Thus there is little concern with anything that might be considered to transcend the natural world.  
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The first take consists of writing an alternative history of the way in 
which the commodity form is currently evolving as a stream of 
experiences which form both biography and context (Lash and Lury, 
2007) by understanding the way in which it has used what might be 
called non-discursive writing to communicate its charms by marrying 
together script and human body - recombining the word and the flesh - 
thus producing a means of modularizing affect.  
 
That is precisely what classical Chinese civilization achieved, not least 
because writing and painting were not distinct terms in classical Chinese 
civilization. Both writing and painting were carried out with the same tool 
(the brush) and Chinese ideograms were much closer to pictorial 
markings whose form is determined but not fixed – indeed, the art of 
writing concerns breathing life back into these markings (Jullien, 2007b). 
Chinese script is based on finding a middle way between boundless 
individuality and the extremes of reduction based on a module system in 
which combinations can be constructed out of interchangeable building 
blocks. What is remarkable about Chinese script is that it has almost fifty 
thousand characters38 and yet out of such a complex system of forms it is 
possible to produce distinguishable units. This is because Chinese script  
is built from a system of forms which form a hierarchy of levels of 
complexity, from the eight basic brushstrokes (element)39 through a 
building block (module) through a single character (unit) through a 
coherent text (series) to all existing characters (mass) (Ledderose. 2000). 
The script has evolved over time but it still bears many resemblances to 
the script of two thousand years ago, helped by the much earlier invention 
of printing40. In other words, the script is a cursive which is designed to 
allow duplication and cloning but through graphemes rather than 
phonemes. Of course, many ask why the Chinese did not develop an 
alphabet which is far less cumbersome for the user and correspondingly 
easier to write and to learn. The answer is because Chinese characters are 
symbols of meaning and not sound, held together by a module system 
which makes it possible to both design and remember them, and a means 
of developing and learning them which is always embodied: 
 
‘the human body provided the metaphors through which the the 
script, and hence culture itself, could be valued and validated. 
Good calligraphy has ‘bones’, its ‘sinews’ are taut; weak 
calligraphy is ‘flabby’, ‘fleshy’. The separation of Flesh and the 
                                                 
38 Though only about three thousand signs are in common use. 
39 Not surprisingly, there is argument about the exact number of basic strokes. There may be up to a 
dozen. 
40 Woodblock printing was invented sometime in the seventh century AD (Barrett, 2008). 
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Word might be a central image of those cultures clustered round 
the Mediterranean, or at least a key belief of Christianity, but it is 
their oneness that came to the fore in China over the millennia 
since the tomb of the First Emperor was sealed (Clunas, 2008, p38)  
 
The second take is to consider the way in which producing the 
commodity as an affective efflorescence unfolding in time changes how 
materiality is understood. Here I will draw on the work of François 
Jullien (2007b) on the absence of the nude in classical Chinese 
representation as a means of understanding what is happening to the 
spaces of affect through the medium of a developing armoury of 
logographs. Why the lack of a cult of the definite form in classical China, 
embodied in the nude, that is a constant of Western art? The classical 
Chinese artist did not depict the nude for several reasons. First, the artist 
considered all things to be imbued with energy-breath (qi). Thus rocks are 
‘cloud-roots’, with a denser and more solid concretion than clouds and 
anyone who wants to paint them must be aware of this fact. Those beings 
with constant form – human beings, animals, houses, tools - are obviously 
easier to paint than those beings like rocks or clouds since observers 
know their prescribed form. An error with regard to a constant form does 
not adversely effect the work as a whole - all the artist has to do is to 
compose the same prescribed form - whereas a fault concerning 
inconstant forms like rocks or clouds can threaten the integrity of the 
whole work. Second, and relatedly, the nude produced a template which 
made improvisation difficult. ‘By being enveloped within its form, the 
nude stands out. In this it satisfied perfectly the Greeks’ liking for 
boundaries (Jullien, 2007b, p74). Form and informing are coincident, 
definite, distinct, settled. But this is utterly alien to the Chinese artist’s 
notion of a constantly changing world and to the Chinese artist’s mission 
of depicting the often barely perceptible moment of change from one 
state to another, of what Jullien (2007b) calls trans-formation with all its 
undecidedness. Third, the Chinese did not depict nudes because they 
denied the division between subject and object. Art arose ‘at the point of 
meeting and fusion between interiority and the world and the process … 
of art is born of a continuous interaction between the two’ (Jullien, 
2007b, p80). Thus classical Chinese art did not capture the human 
through representation of an objectified body,  an exposed object 
commanding attention by its presence, ‘folding space around itself, 
saturating it and creating a surrounding vacuum’ (Jullien, 2007b, p81) in 
which all other things are but accessories to or enhancements of the nude. 
Classical Chinese art arises, instead, at the meeting point between 
interiority and world. A mirrored image is anathema. The notion of 
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mimesis is unknown41. A disdain for formal resemblance is everywhere. 
Fourth, Western art has a whole series of technologies of immobilization. 
Traditionally, action and movement are depicted through a succession of 
poses, each illustrating the integrality of form. The advent of photography 
only underlines this theme. But Chinese art is based on the idea that poses 
are to be avoided at all costs. Such fixity means that all capacity for 
variation is lost: all that is left is a statue of wood or clay42. But for the 
Chinese artist the goal is to work on the new world now coming into 
existence, on pregnance rather than presence, on a ‘possible’ from which 
nothing is necessarily excluded. 
 
Thus, the Chinese artist had to be trained to improvise; 
 
In order to render a character well, his image must be captured at 
moments of spontaneous, unstudied reaction: when he suddenly 
changes position, starts moving forward or backward, begins to 
gesticulate; when he is shouting, singing, recovering his breath, 
smiling, starting to reply, frowning, yawning, hurrying. In short, a 
lively rendering requires grasping the fleeting moment of real life; 
not contemplating the subject face to face, but observing him 
obliquely so as to capture what his features cannot help letting 
through, unbeknownst to him. Having taken all the time necessary 
to absorb his expression, ‘I close my eyes and I seem to see him 
before me’; and ‘when I suddenly give my brush free rein, it is as if 
he were there beneath it’ (Wang Yi); and then, as though in the 
throes of inspiration, one encapsulates the critical feature. A 
number of anecdotes tell us that rather than looking directly at the 
model, the artist would prefer to reproduce the shadow cast upon 
the wall, whose outline, unburdened by matter, has greater powers 
of suggestion. This is a far cry from the modelling of the nude’ 
(Jullien, 2007b, p79).  
 
It seems to me that aspects of modern life are gradually swinging towards 
a notion of art and culture not so very removed from classical Chinese 
notions of art, based upon tapping into characteristic automatisms which 
can be represented by a vocabulary based on new kinds of non-discursive 
script that bear an uncanny resemblance to the notion of the Chinese 
ideogram in their degree of spatial potency. These developments have 
arisen from a heady mixture of technical, symbolic and psychic changes, 
                                                 
41 Remember that the classical Chinese had no knowledge of the theatre (opera is a recent invention) 
nor, consequently, of the stage upon which action is displayed and upon which all eyes are focused. 
42 Indeed, when the Chinese first discovered Western painting they thought of it as sculpture. 
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each one enabling the other. They are, in effect, a means of modularizing 
affect through the invention of nascent logographic languages. 
 
The advent of affective engines based on a logographic script which 
allows environments to be designed to produce particular kinds of mood 
is what I want to examine in detail in my third take. For what is now 
happening is that these engines are being written into life. To apprehend 
this process, I will cheat a little and move from an exact emphasis on 
China, though not too much.  In the novel Air Geoff Ryman chronicles 
the story of the last rural village to be incorporated into ‘air’ in a place 
that bears many resemblances to a remote Chinese province, thus both 
tapping simultaneously into Sloterdijk’s atmospherics, and referring to a 
new telecommunications system – air - that uses quantum technology to 
implant an equivalent of the Internet in everyone's mind - ‘TV in the 
head’ -  so linking all of the village into a system which bears most 
resemblance to the current ideal of pervasive or ‘cloud’ computing. 
Ryman’s novel is a story of this new atmosphere and the loss of a certain 
kind of individuality it imposes in which the memories of people become 
superimposed in each other through the medium of air so that quite 
different forms of individuation start to appear: I and us are mixed in new 
ways that simultaneously add and wash away, form and burn, as a kind of 
healing takes place. Site becomes a living palimpsest of all kinds of sites, 
interlinked through new geographies. Ryman’s novel also takes up 
another of Sloterdijk’s themes: the story of how the last ‘human beings’ 
react to the new atmosphere and the story of the way that new human 
beings came to have shape and what that shape is in a reloaded zoo of 
their own making.  
 
The point is that a world is coming into existence which bears some of 
the characteristics of Ryman’s fictionalised Chinese province (Thrift, 
2005, 2007, 2008). Thus, to begin with, objects and events are becoming 
much less able to be separated. The meaning of what we mean by being 
reliably there  - probably the main characteristic of an object – is 
changing as objects transmute, becoming more open to extension and 
more likely to have varying temporal signatures and qualities of 
succession. The world is becoming Whiteheadian in the sense that it 
becomes a series of forms of process, rather than a form of process. Then, 
the world increasingly becomes the production of tokens of numbers in 
order to produce simulations of environments. Logograms are much more 
suited to this world (Rodowick, 2007). Finally, Ryman’s story chimes 
with the ontological turn in film and television theory. As Cavell pointed 
out many years back, the creation of a new medium requires the creation 
of new repetitive automatisms – forms, conventions, genres - which add 
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up to a new mode of existence as their potentiality is realised, not least 
because they circumscribe what subjectivity is or can be. Logograms are 
able to unleash a new series of automatisms which attest to what can be 
discovered in the world in new ways. 
  
Finally, in my fourth take, I want to suggest that these processes are 
producing a bio-cultural redefinition of space, the result of the evolution 
of new neural pathways. The move to logographic ways of proceeding 
begins to re-groove the brain. Thus, recent research suggests that Chinese 
ideograms have produced a particular arrangement of the brain: not 
having an alphabet causes the brain to arrange itself differently, etching 
the flesh in an alternative way, so to speak. When a Chinese reader scans 
Chinese characters different areas of the brain are activated from those 
found in the brains of those who use alphabets; ‘ a brain wired to read 
Egyptian hieroglyphs or Chinese characters activates some areas never 
used to read the Greek or English alphabet, and vice versa’ (Wolf, 2008, 
p217)43.  
 
The sheer effort involved in learning Chinese characters by writing the 
characters over and over again (in distinction to learning alphabetic 
systems which require much less writing input), coupled with the 
traditional system of learning itself, which often begins with ‘writing in 
the air’ by ‘motioning the characters with sweeping gestures of the arm 
and hand, naming each element of the character as it is formed, and then 
pronounc[ing] the character at the end’ (Ingold, 2007, p135), means that 
words are remembered as gestures - and so written into the body through 
movement as much as vision. This kinetic etching activates both 
hemispheres of the brain, and, in particular, those parts of it which 
involve motoric memory skills. Thus, learning Chinese characters calls 
on right hemisphere areas known to contribute to the spatial analysis 
needed to make sense of logographic symbols, as well as parts of the 
brain involved in object recognition, suggesting that the new non-
discursive languages are calling on different parts of the brain (Wolf, 
2008). This kind of cultural grooving of the brain – shaping not dictating 
- should not surprise us in a time in which we know just how fast genetic 
change can take place leading to at least minor changes in evolutionarily 
double quick time, even in the brain44. At the same time, it starts to 
expose some of the mechanisms by which culture becomes engrained in 
                                                 
43 It may be that certain neural conditions like autism and dyslexia are born, at least in part, out of lack 
of adjustment to alphabetic systems of writing since they seem to involve thinking in pictures rather 
than words (c.f. Grandin, 2005, Ferguson, 2008). 
44 Thus it took about 10000 years for the skin of the first Europeans’ skin to whiten and 8000 years for 
the gene for blue eyes to appear. But changes in the vascular system and fingerprints have been 
happening over the last 80 years (see Smail, 2008). 
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space and space becomes engrained in culture. We can indeed be wired 
for site. 
 
Conclusions 
 
What I have attempted in this paper is to produce an alternative account 
of the contemporary spatial condition to that of Sloterdijk, one which 
demands a range of responses and, in particular, the construction of an 
experimental, even improvisatory, attitude rather like that found in the 
canons of classical Chinese art, one based on a body of training and 
discipline which will allow the moment to be captured in different and 
more expansive ways than those that are currently on offer. This new art 
will have to be based, at least in part, on greater critical understanding of 
the various logographic traditions that now circulate in the West45, and 
how to question them, rather as the well-known Chinese artist, Xu Bing, 
has been attempting as he interrogates the technics of Chinese script and 
its apprehensions of the world by producing characters that have no 
meaning – and yet do (Erickson, 2001, Zhang Zhaohui, 2005, Silbergeld 
and Ching, 2006)46. 
 
Let me end where I began – with landscape. In the 1930s, a Chinese poet, 
author and artist called Chiang Yee (1933-1977)47 travelled through 
classic British landscapes – the Lake District, London, the Yorkshire 
Dales, Oxford and Edinburgh - commenting on his responses to them and 
illustrating each of the works with exquisite sketches that rendered them 
according to Chinese landscape traditions48. The calligraphy and form are 
clearly Chinese49, but the subject matter and the framing are English. My 
argument in this paper has been that something similar to this act of 
translation is now taking place as space becomes message and medium. 
Space is being rendered anew according to logographic traditions so as to 
better capture and even produce affect. Of course, this is not to say that 
                                                 
45 I am well aware that I could have drawn on different traditions of logographic interrogation than the 
Chinese tradition, such as some kinds of visual poetry. For example, think of Brazilian concrete poetry 
and its emphasis on playing with form, as found in the works of Haraldo de Campos, Augusto de 
Campos, and Decio Pignatari. 
46 Though I am sure that Xu Bing was playing with all kinds of moments of critique, drawing on both 
Eastern and Western influences (like Warhol), what I think is interesting about works like Book from 
the Sky is the way that they dislocate a certain perception of the environment in which characters can 
themselves be seen as participants. 
47 Chiang Yee left China in 1933 and subsequently worked at the University of London and the 
Wellcome Museum of Anatomy and Pathology before crossing the Atlantic to become a lecturer (and 
ultimately Emeritus Professor of Chinese) at Columbia University, with an interlude when he was 
Emerson Fellow in Poetry at Harvard University. He returned to live in China in 1975. 
48 After the Second World War, he travelled farther afield, producing books on New York, Dublin, 
Paris, Boston, San Francisco, and Japan. 
49 Chiang Yee wrote two books on calligraphy, as well as an interpretation of Chinese painting. 
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the cultural wiring of Chinese culture is simply being translated across 
into different contexts. After all, even Chiang Yee has sometimes been 
accused of a particular modernist bias in his apparently traditional 
renditions. Rather, I am arguing that some of the kinds of motivating 
principles with which Chinese culture worked are now becoming general 
as a result of the current reworking of space. To the extent that the West 
lost a calligraphic/logographic tradition (Drogin, 1994), this is now being 
resurrected or simply reinvented, but in an electronic format, one that is 
awakening us to new possibilities. To that extent, I agree with Sloterdijk: 
new atmospheres are being created. 
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